The Russian Philosophy of Beyond Visual Range Air Combat (2024)

Russia's aerospace industry hasdisplayed enormous creativity in missile design over the last 25 years,spanning the turbulent last decade of the Cold War, and the post ColdWar era. During this period we have seen the incremental evolution ofweapons established in service in the last years of the Cold War, thedeployment of projects started during the Cold War, and a good numberof entirely new projects which emerged during the 1990s period.

The operators of Russian fighters can now access a remarkably diverserange of weapons, available more than often with a range of differentseekers sharing common airframes, or common seeker designs integratedinto different airframes.

The result of this diversity in airframe performance and seekercapabilities is a veritable nightmare for Western planners as well asdesigners of electronic and infrar-red countermeasures suites. Aninbound BVR missile could be equipped with one of several differentsemi-active radar homing, active radar homing, infrared-homing orpassive X-band anti-radiation homing seekers. The missile might beusing one of several possible airframes or derivatives, with diversekinematic performance.

The aim of this analysis is toexplain the thinking underpinning Russian Beyond Visual Range missilecapabilities, test these against Western capabilities, and map out theknown derivatives of the most commonly used Russian BVR AAMairframes and seekers, accepting that there is likely to be just asmuch Western observers do not know, in terms of alternate seekers andairframes.

Australian readers should note that considerations of Russiancapabilities and technique in BVR combat have clearly not been factoredinto any recent force structure planning for the RAAF, despite thesecapabilities now arriving in the region.

The Russian paradigm of BVRcombat has its origins in the Cold War period, when Sovietoperationalanalysis indicated that the low kill probability of missile seekers andairframes,especially if degraded by countermeasures, would be a major impedimentto success. By the 1970s the standard Soviet technique in a BVR missilelaunch was to salvo two rounds, a semi-active radar homing weapon and aheatseeking weapon. To this effect some Soviet fighters even included aweapons select mode which automatically sequenced the launch of tworounds for optimal separation.

The mathematics of multipleround missile engagements are unambiguous -the size of a missile salvo launched is a stronger driver of successthan the actual kill probability of the individual missiles. If themissiles are wholly identical by type, then the following curves may beoptimistic, insofar as a factor degrading the kill probability of onemissile is apt to have a similar effect on its siblings in a salvo.However, where the missiles differ by seeker type and guidance controllaws, then the assumptionof statistically independent missile shots is very much stronger.

Loadout options for Su-35BM/Su-35-1: 5 xLong Range AAM (R-172/AAM-L); 8 x R-27ER1/R1 Alamo; 4 x R-27ET1/T1 orR-27EP1/P1 Alamo; 12 x R-77/RVV-E Adder; 6 x R-73E Archer. The loadoutfor the active radar seeker equipped R-27EA would be 8 rounds (KnAAPO).

A critical question which mustbe asked when assessing the effectiveness of Russian BVR tactics isthat of Western tactics and the effectiveness of the AIM-120 AMRAAM, the principal Western BVRfighter weapon. The AIM-120A AMRAAM was introduced at the end of theCold War to provide a "fire and forget" active radar guided weapon witha midcourse inertial guidance system and datalink support provided bythe radar on the launch aircraft, allowing multiple concurrent shots.The AIM-120A was followed by the incrementally improved B-model, andthen by the "short span" AIM-120C-3 sized to fit the F-22A weapon bay.The AIM-120C-4 has better kinematic performance introducing a largerrocket motor and shorter control section, and a better warhead, whilethe AIM-120C-6 introduced a better fuse. The latest AIM-120D introducesa redesigned seeker built for better durability in high vibrationcarriage environments, a two way datalink, GPS to supplement inertialguidance, incrementally improved kinematics, and better seekerperformance against high off-boresight targets.

Most AIM-120 AMRAAM kills todate have involved 1980s export variants of the MiG-29 Fulcrum, withmediocre electronic warfare fit and often inoperative systems. Theseare not representative targets in the current Pacific Rim environment.

The performance of the AIM-120A/B/C models in combat to date has notbeen spectacular. Test range trials have resulted in stated killprobabilities of 85 percent out of 214 launches for the AIM-120Cvariant. Combat statistics for all three variants are less stellar,amounting to, according to US sources, ten kills (including a friendlyfire incident against aUH-60) of which six were genuine BVR shots, for the expenditure of justover a dozen AIM-120 rounds. The important parameter is that everysingle target was not equipped with a modern defensive electronicwarfare package and therefore not representative of astate-of-the-art Flanker in a modern BVR engagement. Against such"soft" targets the AIM-120 has displayed a kill probability of lessthan 50 percent [1].

It is an open question whether the AIM-120D whenchallenged with a modern DRFM (Digital RF Memory) based monopulsetrackbreaking jammer willbe able to significantly exceed the 50 percent order of magnitude killprobability of prior combat launches, let alone replicate the 85percent performance achieved in ideal test range conditions [2].

Where does this leave Westernair forces equipped with the AIM-120 when confronting Flankers armedwith up to three times the number of BVR missiles?

Illustrative examples are the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet and F-35 JSF, thelatterarmed in an air superiority configuration with two, the former with upto six AIM-120s [3].Assuming the Flanker driver does not exploit his superior missilekinematic range and shoot first - an optimistic assumption - then thebest case kill probability for the AIM-120 shooter firing two to fourrounds is better than 90 percent. However, if we assume that hostilejamming and manoeuvre degrade the kill probability to around 50 percent- a reasonably optimistic statistical baseline here - then the totalkill probability for a two round salvo is optimistically around 75percent, and for a four round salvo over 90 percent. Arguably good oddsfor the four round salvo, only if the missile kill probability sits at50 percent, but the F/A-18E/F or F-35 JSF will have expended all ormost of itswarload of AIM-120s and be unable to continue in BVR combat. In a"many versus many" engagement, the low speed of both types leaves themunable to disengage and will see both types subsequently killed byanother Flanker.

This best case "many versus many" engagement scenario sees theF/A-18E/F or F-35 JSF being traded one for one with Su-30MK/Su-35BMFlankers in BVR combat, which is the general assumption made for WVRcombat between like opponents, and representative of many historicalattrition air campaign statistics. To achieve this best case "manyversus many" outcome of trading F/A-18E/F or F-35 JSF one for one, wehave stacked a series of assumptions against the Flanker - dumb Flankerpilots not exploiting a missile kinematic range advantage, dumb Flankerpilotsnot exploiting a firepower advantage, Russian BVR missile seekers nobetter than the AIM-120, and Russian DRFM monopulse jammers achieving aless than 50 percent degradation of AIM-120 kill probability [4].

A competent Flanker driver gets the first shot with three or four roundsalvo of long burn R-27 variants, with mixed seekers, leaving one ortwo remaining salvoes of BVR missiles on his rails, and the sameFlanker driver will have modern DRFM monopulse jammers capable ofcausing likely muchmore than a 50 percent degradation of AIM-120 kill probability. With athrust vectoring engine capability (TVC), the Flanker driver has theoption ofmaking himself into a very difficult endgame target for the AIM-120regardless of the capability of his jamming equipment. Since allof the AIM-120s fired are identical in kinematic performance and seekerjam resistance, any measure applied by the Flanker driver which iseffective against one AIM-120 round in the salvo is apt to produce thesameeffect against all AIM-120 rounds - a problem the Flanker driver doesnot havedue to diversity in seeker types and missile kinematics.

Currently classifiedcapabilities such as the use of the APG-79 or APG-81 AESA radar as anX-band high power jammer against the Russian BARS or Irbis E radar arenot a panacea, and may actually hasten the demise of the F/A-18E/F orF-35 JSF in a BVR shootout. This is for the simple reason that to jamthe Russian radar, the APG-79 or APG-81 AESA radar must jam thefrequencies being used by the Russian radar, and this then turns theAPG-79or APG-81 AESA radar into a wholly electronically predictable X-bandhigh power beacon for an anti-radiation seeker equipped Russian BVRmissile such as the R-27EP or R-77P. The act of jamming the Russianradar effectively surrendersthe frequency hopping agility in the emissions of the APG-79 or APG-81AESA radar, denying it the only defence it has against theanti-radiation missile. A smart Russian radar software designer willinclude a "seduction mode" to this effect, with narrowband emissions tomake it very easy even for an early model 9B-1032 anti-radiation seeker.

The flipside of the electronic combat game is no better. The F-14A/B/Dincluded the AAS-42 Infrared Search and Track set which allowed atarget to be tracked despite hostile jamming of the AWG-9/APG-71 radar.It is clear that the addition of the podded AAS-42 to the Super Hornetand "air to air" use of the JSF EOTS are intended for much the samepurpose. While this may permit the continuing use of the AESA radar todatalink midcourse guidance commands to the AIM-120s, it does nothingto deny the Flanker its own BVR shot. The notion that the defensivejamming equipment and infrared decoys will be highly effective againstlate model Russian digital missile seekers can only be regarded to beoptimistic.

In electronic warfare termsneither side has a decisive advantage, but the Flanker does have adecisive advantage in aircraft and missile kinematics and in having upto six times the payload of BVR missiles to expend. The simpleconclusionto be drawn is that operators of the F/A-18E/F or F-35 JSF should makeevery effort to avoid Beyond Visual Range combat with late modelFlankers, as the best case outcome is parity in exchange rates, and theworst case outcome a decisive exchange ratio advantage to the Flanker.Given the evident design choices the Russians have made, this is not anaccident, but rather a consequence of well thought through operationalanalysis ofcapabilities and limitations of contemporary BVR weapon systems.

The achievable kill probabilityof any missile depends on its kinematic performance, especially duringthe endgame phase of flight, against the intended target, and theperformance of its seeker and fusing subsystems, especially in acountermeasures environment.

Until the 1980s Soviet missile technology lagged the West inpropellants, airframe designs, and guidance designs. That changed withthe deployment of the R-27 and R-73 missiles during the 1980s, as thesecompeted on a equal footing, or outperformed their Western equivalents.In kinematic terms, the WVR R-73 series, and the BVR R-27 and R-77 arehighly competitive against their Western equivalents, and the long burnvariants of the R-27 outperform all Western solid propellantcompetitors.

The next evolutionary step for Vympel is the production of the airbreathing ramjet RVV-AE-PD design, displayed since the 1990s atnumerous trade shows. This missile spurred the development of theMeteor for the Eurofighter Typhoon. The attraction of ramjet BVR AAMslies in their ability to sustain thrust and thus turning performance inthe endgame phase of an engagement, where conventional soild rocketmissiles are flying on inertia alone and rapidly lose speed whenturning. It is worth noting that the high lethality of late generationWVR missiles like the Python 4/5 is in a large part due to themissile's ability to sustain ~100G class load factors during theendgame manoeuvre, precisely the regime in which most BVR missiles failto kill their targets.

Range extension options for the baseline R-77 include booster packs,discussed in Russian literature, orlarger diameter rocket motors containing a larger propellant load, thelatter proposed some years ago for R-77-ZRK surface to air derivativeof this missile.

In terms of kinematic performance, a key factor which is almostuniversally ignored by Western planners other than the F-22 and F-111communities, is the impact of the launchaircraft's kinematics at the point of missile launch. A supersonicSu-35 sitting at Mach 1.5 and 45,000 ft will add of the order of 30percent more range to an R-27 or R-77 missile. Low performance fighterslike the F/A-18E/F and F-35 JSF simply do not have this option in thereal world, and the reach of their missiles is wholly determined by theparameters of the propellant load inside the missile casing, and theability of the midcourse guidance algorithms to extract every bit ofrange from that stored energy. The result of this is that an AIM-120C/Dwhich might look better on paper compared to an equivalent R-77 subtypewill be outranged decisively in actual combat.

Russian seeker technology has advanced in strides since the early1990s, largely as a result of the commodification of Gallium Arsenidemonolithic chips and digital signal processing chips in the globalisedworldmarket. Agat, which manufactures the 9B-1101K semi-active radar seekerfor the R-27EP/P, the 9B-1103K active seeker for the R-27EA/A, and the9B-1348E seeker family for the R-77 missile family, publicly disclosedsomeyears ago the use of the Texas Instruments TMS-320 series digitalsignalprocessing chip in a late model 'digital' variant of the 9B-1103Kseeker. This chip is a mainstay of Western military radar design.

The move away from analogue and hardwired digital seekers to softwareprogrammable digital seekers is an important milestone for the Russianindustry, since it opens up many choices in signal processing andcounter-countermeasures techniques hitherto only used by US, EU andIsraeli manufacturers. In practical terms a later model digital variantof the 9B-1103K or 9B-1348E will be no less difficult to defeat byjamming than Western equivalent active seekers [5].

The monopulse slottedplanar array antenna technology used in the 9B-1103K and 9B-1348Eseekerscompares closely to the antenna technology seen since the AIM-120A wasdeployed, anddue to its dual plane monopulse design provides good resistance to arange of legacy jamming techniques.

Russian concern about Western countermeasures is reflected in apropensity since the 1980s to use dual plane monopulse seeker designs,and even the baseline Agat 9B-1101K semi-active homing seeker in theR-27R/ER variants isaclassical monopulse design, built for high jam resistance (referphotos).

The infrared homing seeker technology used in Russian BVR missiles hasalso evolved considerably since the Cold War. Early R-27 Alamo variantsused the legacy Geofizika 36T seeker. There are claims that morerecent variants use the far more agile Arsenal Central Design BureauMayak/MK-80M seeker series, developed for the R-73M Adder WVR missile,and since then announced by Vympel as the seeker for the initialheatseekingvariants of the R-77 Adder. The R-73 series WVR missiles have evolved,to the extent that the 'digital' K-74E variant is a highly competitivescanning two colour design, inherently resistant to many flares andwiththe counter-countermeasures flexibility inherent in softwareprogrammable guidance systems. Given the established pattern ofmigrating extant WVR missile seekers into BVR missiles, it is a safeprediction that late build heatseeking R-27ET/Ts and early buildheatseeking R-77Ts are likely to use late build derivatives of theArsenal MK-80M series, such as the MM2000 subtype.

It is well known that Russian industry is working on a Focal PlaneArray(FPA) seeker for their future WVR missiles, to compete against theASRAAM, AIM-9X, Iris-T and Python 5 seekers, adding further infraredcounter-countermeasures capabilities. The open question is whether thefuture Russian FPA seeker will match the midwave Indium Antimonidedetector array technology in the Raytheon 256x256 device in theASRAAM/AIM-9X, or whether the Russians will leapfrog a generation andopt for much more capable QWIP (Quantum Well Imaging Photodetector)technology pioneered by Germany's industry during the late 1990s.

Thereis considerable Russian scientific literature available on QWIPs, whichallow a single chip to concurrently image targets in two infraredcolour bands, and permit tailored infrared colour sensitivity absent inbandgap detector technology such as the legacy InSb designs used inASRAAM and AIM-9X seekers. With the exception of thenow retired F-117A, and the remaining B-2A, infrared emissions are amajor signature issue for low observable fighters. While the lowobservable technology used is generally good against the upper radarbands, it is less so against high performance lower band infraredsensors. A QWIP based missile seeker operating in the LWIR bands (8-12micron and 15 micron) has the potential to be quite effective, if themidcourse guidance scheme can get the BVR missile close enough toacquire the target.

Details of the Avtomatika 9B-1032 passive X-band RF anti-radiationseeker remain classified at this time, and even the antennaconfiguration has not been disclosed to date. This remains a uniquecapability in the R-27EP/P Alamo and R-77P Adder. What is clear is thatthe drive to digitise all Russian AAM seekers will be reflected also inanti-radiation seekers. It is known that the PLA has funded Russiandevelopment of new passive seeker technology for this application.

Fusing technology in use includes radio-frequency proximity fuses andin more recent designs, active laser proximity fuses.

From a Western strategic planning perspective the key development inRussian BVR missile seeker technology over the last decade has been themove away from legacy analogue techniques to digital softwareprogrammable techniques. This permits Russian designers enormousflexibility in embedding counter-countermeasures modes into theseseekers, as well as enormous opportunities in smart signal processingto maximise detection range performance. Digital autopilot technologyhas been pivotal to optimising the kinematic capabilities of Westernmissiles and this technology is now available to Russian designers.

What is unclear from Russian literature at this time is whether thereis an intent to expand the range of seeker technologies to increasekill probabilities in countermeasures intensive environments, andagainst low observable targets. Other than incremental development ofextant seekers, there are options in the upper millimetric wave bands,and in LIDAR/LADAR (laser radar) technologies. While these may suffersimilar weather penetration limitations to passive infrared sensors,this is often irrelevant in high altitude BVR combat above thetropopause. There are no fundamental technological reasons why extantmicrowave band radar seekers and laser homing seekers cannot be evolvedto provide additional millimetric band and laser based seekers,respectively.

Multimode (or multispectral) seekers have not been common to date inWestern or Russian missiles, mostly for reasons of cost and complexity- the best know examples being the RIM-116 Rolling Airframe Missile(RAM) and RIM-7R Sparrow, combining passive radiometer and semi-activeradar homing guidance with heatseeking guidance, respectively. LargerBVR missiles like the R-37 and AAM-L easily have the seeker volume toaccommodate a multimode seeker and we should not be surprised to seeeither weapon gain an additional infrared guidance capability, giventhe cost of these missiles and the very high value of their intendedtargets. What may not be profitable in smaller missiles becomesprofitable in a counter-ISR missile.

One interesting Russian development, which underscores the willingnessof Russian industry to experiment, is the Agat 9B-1103K-150"Hummingbird" seeker, a downsized derivative of the R-27EA/RVV-AEseeker family sized to fit into an R-73/R-74 Archer WVR AAM seeker. Thereasoning behind this evolution has not been disclosed to date. Thereare two obvious possibilities. The first is an active radar guidedR-73/R-74 Archer derivative to provide counter-countermeasuresdiversity in close combat. Another possibility, given the Russianhistory of two stage or booster equipped missiles, is mating a9B-1103K-150 or MK-80M/MM-2000 equipped R-74 terminal stage with a BVRcapable long range midcourse stage for instance derived from the R-27or R-37 series. Such a weapon would use the jettisonable midcourseairframe to effectively deliver the high kill probability terminalkill airframe into close proximity of the target. While such a weaponwouldbe more complex than established BVR missile designs, it would overcomethe primary deficiency of most such designs, in endgame lethality.

As with other key areas of aerial warfighting technology, Russia'sindustry has entered the globalised digital age and is making full useof thetechnological gains to be had.

Comparativeassessment of regional AAM types

Su-35Sdemonstrator displaying theR-172/AAM-L, the R-27ET1 Alamo and the R-77Adder at MAKS 2007 (KnAAPO).

Comparisonof short burn R-27T1 heatseeker and long burn R-27ER SARH variants.Note the larger motor of the latter variant (KnAAPO).

Long burn R-27ET1heatseekervariant under the wing of an Su-35 demonstrator (KnAAPO).

Agat AAM seekers. Left to right: 9B-1101Kdual plane monopulse semi-active homing seeker used in R-27R1/ER1, 9B-1348E activeradar homing seeker used in R-77 variants, and 9B-1103K active radar homing seeker forR-27EA (Agat). For comparison,developmentalAIM-120A antenna assembly below (Hughes Aircraft Company photo)

Su-30MK launchingan R-77(KnAAPO)

The new R-37 was developedduring the late 1980s to provide a very long range BVR missile for arange of Soviet fighters. It is not as commonly believed a dedicatedreplacement for the AIM-54 Phoenix-like R-33 / AA-9 Amos, although theupgraded MiG-31M Super Foxhoundwas the trials platform for test shots - Russian sources indicate themissile was envisaged for the Su-35, Su-37, I.42 MFI and future types.

The role of the R-37 also differs from the R-33 - it was devised tokill large ISR and IW/EW platforms at long ranges, specifically the E-3AWACS, E-8 JSTARS, RC-135V/W Rivet Joint, EC-130 Compass Call andEC-130 Commando Solo.

The missile uses large midbody strakes for enhanced lift, and foldingcruciform tail controls for semiconformal carriage. A variant of theAgat 9B-1388 active seeker is employed, claimed to be capable ofacquiring a 5 square metre target at 21.5 NMI. Production rounds arehowever likely to be equipped with Agat's improved ARGS-PD seeker.Range performance varieswith the flight profile, from 80 NMI for a direct shot, to a maximum of215 NMI for a cruise glide profile. In 1994 a trial round killed atarget at 162 NMI, a record for a BVR missile.

The R-37 is now in production to equipped upgraded Russian MiG-31BMFoxhound interceptors, and export MiG-31BM aircraft for Syria. Despitethe early intent to integrate the weapon on the Flanker, this has yetto be reported.

Novator RVV-L / R-172 /K-100

The R-172, previouslydesignated the KS-172, is a departure from the established focus ofNovator, designers of the S-300V (SA-12) system's long range SAMs. Likethe R-37, the R-172 was developed as an 'AWACS killer'. The missileemploys an active radar seeker and inertial midcourse guidance.Two configurations are known, with and without a booster pack. With thebooster the missile is claimed to achieve a range of 215 NMI, without160 NMI. Cited seeker performance is similar to the R-37.

While the R-172 is less mature than the R-37, India has recentlynegotiated an arrangement to fund final development and licence producethe weapon, not unlike the extant deal to licence the Yakhont as theBrahMos.